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Abstract: A contract where the agent is compensated ex post only upon satisfactory performance, often called a no-cure-
no-pay contract, can arise as under several circumstances. In this paper, we model the problem of contractual choice as a 
principal-agent contract which is modified due to hidden information about the competence of the agent to fulfill the obli-
gations of the contract. The agent offers a choice of contracts to the principal, thereby signalling agent competence to the 
principal, and there is no alternative reputation mechanism to the contract for the principal's bargaining strategy. It turns 
out that in this situation, the optimal contract will have a form which may be recognized as a no-cure-no-pay contract. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in 
analyzing contract forms. The type of contract which arises 
in a particular economic context will usually be a reflection 
of the underlying economic conditions, and the contract 
forms prevailing in different kinds of business, such as bank-
ing, insurance, healthcare etc. display features which can be 
traced back to the basic economic relationship between the 
parties. But while the understanding of the nature of con-
tracts is growing, the same contracts tend to change over 
time. Thus, various forms of contracts originating in mari-
time salvage and US tort practice have emerged in recent 
years. This is particularly the case for professional service 
firms where the use of "unconditional service guarantees'' is 
becoming more and more widespread. These latter are seen 
as a form of signalling in intensely competitive markets, and 
hotel, health care, investment banking, and accounting firms 
attempt such contracting in order to win market share. In this 
paper we explore the formal conditions under which both 
principal and agent prefer to enter into such contracts. 
 Where unconditional service guarantees as offered by 
professional service firms represent a trend covering about 
twenty five years, maritime salvage contracting and US law 
firm contingent legal fee contracts have been in existence for 
a much longer time. No-cure-no-pay provisions in maritime 
salvage contracting datefrom the Rhodian maritime law in 
Hellenistic Greece. Similarly, no-win-no-fee contracting 
between client and lawyer in US tort law spread widely 
throughout the United States in the19th Century, so that it 
was sanctioned by the American Bar Association through the 
latter's adoption of canon 13 of the ABA Code of Ethics in 
1908 [1]. In maritime salvage and contingent fee contracting, 
the agent is compensated ex post only upon satisfactory per-
formance. The rate of agent compensation is a function of  
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the property or service on which the agent has a lien, the 
value of ship, cargo or tort law suit, and of the risk borne by 
the agent. 
 There has been little theoretical focus on the underlying 
conditions by which both principal and agent in very diverse 
fields of business prefer to enter into contracts of the above 
type. With regard to maritime salvage contracting, this may 
be due to lack of economic analysis of such contracting gen-
erally [2, 3], for analyses of maritime salvage in the broader 
context of voluntary rescue). Literature on service guarantee 
contracts is similarly sparse. Coverage of the topic is either 
general without an analysis of the contractual incentive as-
pects [4], or is specifically directed to the introduction of 
such contracts into specific professional services [5]. In con-
trast there is a voluminous literature on contingent fee con-
tracts. Analysed phenomena are numerous and the following 
is just a sampling of the more recent literature: contingent 
fees versus fixed fees or hourly fees for lawyer services [1, 
6-9]; contingent fees and the trade-offs between out of court 
settlement versus going to trial [10,11]; the efficiency of the 
contingent fee system [12-14]; and, even the impact of con-
tingent fee rents on the market for lawyers [15]. 
 In this paper we introduce a formal model of contracting 
in order to see how specific contracts may emerge as pre-
ferred contract forms in situations where one party has re-
stricted access to information about capability and effort of 
the other contracting party. The model is a version of the 
principal-agent model to which we have added another ele-
ment of asymmetric information: the principal cannot ob-
serve the agent's capability to do the job at hand (even in the 
case of high agent effort). In the formal set-up to be studied, 
the agent offers the principal the contract under which he 
proposes to work, and the principal accepts or rejects the 
contract. This contract may thus be used as a signal of agent 
capability, and in the resulting game we study the perfect 
Bayesian equilibria that may occur. It turns out that on weak 
assumptions on beliefs, these contracts exhibit only 
equilibria which are separating in the sense that competent 
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and incompetent agents propose different contracts. This 
property may then be used to exhibit the emergence of no-
cure-no-pay contracts in the limiting case of total agent in-
competence. 
 The idea of explaining no-cure-no-pay by double infor-
mation asymmetry is not new; notably, the work on no-cure-
no-pay contracts by Rubinfeld and Scotchmer [6] on contin-
gent fee also uses the framework of the principal-agent 
model. However, in their model clients (principals) signal 
quality of their case whereas lawyers may choose different 
effort levels. In our setup, signalling is all on the part of the 
agent; this seems to fit better with at least some of the real-
world instances of no-cure-no-pay contracts and in any case 
provides an alternative explanation which works in the case 
of lawyer fees when the cases are sufficiently transparent. 
 Finally, it should be mentioned that the case of no pay-
ment in case of failure does not pose a logical lower limit 
what can happen in incentive contracts, since one might also 
consider inverse payments, giving rise to what is known as 
super-contingent fee contracts [16, 17]. Such contracts are 
however outside the scope of the present paper. 
 The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we intro-
duce the formal model in a rather general setup and present a 
first result on the emergence of contracts with no-cure-no-
pay features as signals of competence, followed by a treat-
ment of a simpler version of the model, where we describe 
the equilibria which may occur. In Section 3 we discuss the 
extent to which the results fits with the actual situation in the 
fields which gave rise to this study, and Section 4 contains 
some concluding remarks. Proofs of the propositions in the 
paper are given in Section 5. 
2. A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL WITH HIDDEN 
INFORMATION ON AGENT CAPABILITY 
 In this section, we present a simple model of the situation 
where a service is to be provided but where the recipient has 
no access to information about effort as well as the overall 
ability of the provider to carry out the task. The model is a 
version of the well-known principal-agent model [18-20], 
and only a few changes in the basic framework are needed: 
We add that the agents come with varying degree of compe-
tence, something which cannot be observed by the principal. 
Thus, in our model, hidden action and hidden information 
come together, actually a very widespread feature of real-
world contractual relationships. 
 There are two individuals, denoted 'principal' and 'agent'. 
If the parties contract, the outcome to the principal takes the 
form of a money payoff b with values in an interval b1,b2[ ] , 
which is subject to uncertainty. Th probability of outcome 
depends on the agent's type t and her effort e, described by a 
probability distribution function F(b | t,e)  with den-
sity f (b | t,e)  (so that f (b | t,e) = ? F (b | t,e)). We as-
sume that both type and effort take values between 0 and 1; 
increasing t is interpreted as increasing competence, and 
similarly, higher value of e means that more effort is put 
forward. 
 Only the final outcome b, but neither t nor e is observed 
by the principal. A contract between principal and agent 
specifies a payment to the agent, which can depend only on 
what is observable to both, that is the final outcome. There-
fore, contracts are functions r : b1,b2[ ]?R , where r(b) is 
the payment to the agent when outcome is b. 
 We assume that the agent is risk averse with utility 
u(?,e) =V (?) ?K(e), 
where V is a strictly concave function of the payment from 
the principal ? , normalized so that V(0) = 0, while K is an 
increasing function of e, describing disutility of effort e. 
Since payment will depend on random outcome b, the con-
tract r will be evaluated by expected utility 
Ut (r,e) = (V (b) ?K(e)) f (b | t,e)dbb1
b2? , which de-
pends on t through the probability density function f. There 
is a given reservation utility Ut
0 ? 0  for the agent of type t, 
reflecting what could be obtained by contracting elsewhere. 
 The principal is assumed to be risk neutral, so that what 
matters is expected net payoff, written as ?(r,e) . Here ex-
pectation must be taken both over outcome and over type of 
agent, which is assumed to be distributed in society in accor-
dance with a probability distribution function G(t) with den-
sity g(t). 
 We put some restrictions on the set R of admissible con-
tracts r(b). Thus, (i) the payment is never negative and can-
not exceed the gain of the principal, formally 0 ? r(b) ? b  
for all b, and (ii) if ? b > b, then r( ? b ) ? r(b) , higher out-
come to the principal does not reduce payments to the agent. 
This seems realistic and may also be defended as an incen-
tive compatibility condition in the case where the agent de-
livers the outcome to the principal, since reduction of pay-
ment for a higher outcome might lead to the throwing away 
of part of the outcome. 
 While the model constructed so far differs only slightly 
from the standard principal-agent model, we shall give it a 
somewhat unusual turn by emphasizing the role of the agent: 
Rather than having the principal choose a contract which the 
agent may take or leave, we reverse the roles so that the 
agent proposes a contract which may or may not be accepted 
by the principal. This is more in line with our interpretation, 
and it allows for a new aspect in the game under uncertainty 
considered, namely signalling; the agent sends a signal about 
her capabilities by proposing a contract to the principal. In-
tuitively, the agent signals capability by proposing a contract 
which would be disadvantageous for an incompetent agent. 
 The time schedule of our game is as follows: First of all, 
the agent (of given type) proposes a contract. Then the prin-
cipal chooses whether to accept or reject. If the contract is 
rejected, the game ends, and the players get their reservation 
utilities; if it is accepted, the agent chooses an effort level. 
We shall be interested in contracts that are acceptable for the 
principal given the beliefs about agent competence obtained 
from inspecting the proposal, and on the other hand are such  
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that if they are actually carried through, the agent will choose 
the effort level which maximizes expected utility (a choice 
which is assumed to be uniquely determined at equilibrium). 
Technically, we are considering perfect Bayesian equilibria 
of the game. 
 Formally, an equilibrium is a pair (a,(rt ,et )t?[0,1]), 
where a is a (decision) function taking one of two values (1 
for "accept'' and 0 for "reject'') on each feasible contract r ? 
R, while rt  is the contract proposed by the agent of type t, 
and et  is the effort chosen by this agent (given that the con-
tract is accepted by the principal). The equilibrium properties 
are as follows: For the principal, the contract rt  is accepted 
if ex post expected net gain is nonnegative, where expecta-
tion is taken with respect to the posterior probability distri-
bution over types, 
? t
b1
b2? (rt ,et )g(t | rt )dt ? 0, 
where ? t (rt ,et ) = (b ? rt (b)) f (b | t,e)dbb1
b2?  is ex-
pected gain with an agent of type t, and g(t | rt )  is the pos-
terior density of types (after updating by Bayes' rule). For the 
agent of type t, the choice of contract rt  and of effort level e 
should maximize a(r? )Ut (r? ,e) , expected utility given the 
rule a chosen by the principal. 
 The model as presented here is quite general, and not 
much can be said about equilibrium contracts. However, 
with few additional assumptions we can derive some proper-
ties which can be interpreted as no-cure-no-pay features of 
the equilibrium contracts. We assume in the following that 
the effect of competence and effort is compatible with (first 
order) stochastic dominance in the sense that for all t,t' and 
e,e', if e' > e, then F(? | t, ? e )  stochastically dominates 
F(? | t,e) , and if t'>t, then F(? | ? t ,e)  stochastically domi-
nates F(? | t,e)  (recall that for probability distributions H,H' 
on b1,b2[ ] , H' stochastically dominates H if ? H (b) ? H(b)  
for all b; intuitively, competence and effort will typically 
take higher values when drawn randomly in accordance with 
F' and G' than with F and G). 
 Now we can state our first result, the proof of which may 
be found in the final section of the paper. 
 Proposition 1. In an equilibrium of the contracting game, 
the contract has the following properties: 
(i) higher level of competence is awarded by higher ex-
pected remuneration, 
(ii) if effort is irrelevant at low competence and reserva-
tion utility is strictly increasing in type, then the con-
tract for the incompetent agent specifies a fixed pay-
ment ?0 independent of outcome, and competent 
types are paid more than ?0 only when a certain out-
come threshold is exceeded. 
 The property in (ii) can be seen as generalized no-cure-
no-pay property; it establishes the existence of a threshold in 
outcome (thus defining what is meant by "cure'') such that 
only outcomes above the threshold will give rise to payments 
above the minimum level. 
 In order to obtain more detailed knowledge of equilib-
rium contracts, we restrict attention to the simpler case 
where outcome, competence and effort can take only two 
values, so that b is either b1 or b2 , and t,e ? 0,1{ }, (agents 
can be competent, t = 1, or incompetent, t = 0, and they can 
choose high (e = 1) or low (e = 0) level of effort). The ex-
pected utility of the agent and expected net payoff of princi-
pal at the contract r with r(b1) = r1, r(b2) = r2  are then 
Ut (r,e) = (1? p(t,e))u(r1,e) + p(t,e)u(r2,e)         (1) 
for the agent with competence level t, and 
?(r,e) = (1? q)?0(r,e) + q?1(r,e)  
with 
? t (r,e) = (1? p(t,e))(b1 ? r1) + p(t,e)u(b2 ? r2), t = 0,1 
for the principal. Here we have used the notation p(t,e) for 
the probability of high outcome b2  given competence t and 
effort e and the notation q for the prior probability of t = 1. 
The assumption of stochastic dominance takes the form 
p(1,1) ? p(1, 0), p(0,1) ? p(0, 0);
p(1,1) ? p(0,1), p(1, 0) ? p(0, 0).          (2) 
 At some point we also use an additional assumption to 
the effect that effort has little attraction if competence is low, 
V (b2 ? b1) ? K(1) ?K(0)p(0,1) ? p(0,0) ;          (3) 
to see what is implied by (3) consider a situation where an 
incompetent agent is offered all the gain b2 ? b1 when out-
come is high but nothing when it is low; this may be consid-
ered as the maximal incentive that can be offered through a 
contract. Then expected utility is p(0,1)V (b2 ? b1) if effort 
is high and p(0,0)V (b2 ? b1) if low, and the expression in 
(3) states that the gain in expected utility obtained by choos-
ing high rather than low effort cannot counterbalance the 
utility loss from putting up this additional effort. 
 When studying perfect Bayesian equilibria in the present 
context, it is possible and useful to distinguish between sepa-
rating and pooling equilibria. In a separating equilibrium, 
the signal sent, in our case the contract r proposed, by a 
competent agent differs from that chosen by an incompetent 
agent, and therefore, the principal can use the contract pro-
posed to identify the type of the agent. By the equilibrium 
properties, it must not be advantageous for an agent of any 
type to switch to the contract proposal of the other type. The 
alternative to a separating equilibrium is a pooling equilib-
rium, where the contract is the same for both types, so that 
the principal cannot make any inference about agent type 
from observation of the equilibrium contract. 
 In the present simple setup, there are at most two equilib-
rium contracts, so in any equilibrium there are at most two 
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equilibrium signals available. Therefore, we need an as-
sumption pertaining to the way in which the principal inter-
prets a signal which is not one of the two equilibrium con-
tracts. Technically, we need the principal's subjective prob-
ability over types conditional on the (non-anticipated) signal 
observed. We shall assume that the principal adopts a scepti-
cal attitude towards the agent in such situations: If a contract 
differs from those specified in the equilibrium strategies, 
then the principal will infer that the proposer is incompetent 
unless it violates individual rationality for the incompetent 
type. 
 Proposition 2. In the dichotomous model of contracting, 
and under our assumption on principal inference, we have 
that 
(i) all equilibria are separating. 
 If, in addition, effort has low value for the incompetent 
agent as expressed in (3), then 
(ii) the contract of the incompetent agent prescribes a 
fixed payment independent of outcome, and 
(iii) the contract of the competent agent has the no-cure-
no-pay property in the sense that her payment at low 
outcome equals that of the incompetent agent. 
 The equilibrium contracts can be interpreted in terms of 
indifference curves, using the approach of Hirshleifer and 
Riley [21]. For this, we describe contracts not as pairs 
(r(b1),r(b2)) as in the formalization above, but rather as 
pairs (Z,R), where Z = r(b2) ? r(b1)  and R = r(b2) ; Z is 
now a deduction in the payment caused by low outcome. 
 An indifference curve of an agent of type t, t = 0,1, in the 
(Z,R)-space takes the form 
(1? p(t,e*))u(Z ? R,e*) + p(t,e*)u(R,e*) =U *  
for some given level U* of (expected) utility. Here e* is the 
optimal effort level given Z and R. This optimal level will be 
0 in a region in the (Z,R)-plane containing all small values of 
Z and 1 in the remaining part of the plane. The slope of the 
indifference curve is determined by the probability of low 
outcome, and it is greater for low than for high effort. Indif-
ference curves have the convex shape shown due to the risk 
aversion of the agent, and they have a kink when they pass 
from the region of low effort to that of high effort. 
 For the principal facing an agent of known type t, iso-
profit curves take the form 
(1? p(t,e*))(b1 ? Z + R) + p(t,e*)(b2 ? R) = constant, 
where again e* is the agent's optimal choice of effort, de-
pending on the contract. The indifference chart of the princi-
pal consists of two parts, both linear due to risk neutrality, 
and again the slope is determined by the probability of low 
outcome. The indifference curves have jumps at boundary 
between the low and high effort regions. 
 Using indifference curves of the principal and agent, a 
separating equilibrium can be represented as two points in 
the (Z,R)-plane. One of them corresponds to the contract 
proposed by the incompetent agent who will get no more 
than her reservation utility; in the extreme case where the 
incompetent agent has p(0,0) = p(0,1) = 1, this indifference 
curve coincides with the 45° line. The contract proposed by 
the competent agent in a separating equilibrium cannot be 
situated to the northwest of this line, since in that case the 
incompetent would be better off by showing off as compe-
tent. A point on the 45° line and in the high effort region will 
be an equilibrium contract for the competent agent if it satis-
fies the individual rationality constraints of both principal 
and (competent) agent. 
 This equilibrium differs from what would have been ob-
tained without hidden knowledge; indeed, the contract for 
the competent agent would then be inefficient in the sense 
that both principal and (competent) agent could achieve 
something better (contracts below the indifference curve of 
the principal and above that of the competent agent. The risk 
to be born by the agent is correspondingly higher, so in this 
sense the cost of asymmetric information concerning compe-
tence must be carried by the competent agent. 
3. DOES THE MODEL EXPLAIN REAL WORLD 
CONTRACTS? 
 To what degree does our model apply to the contractual 
forms which were mentioned in the introduction (maritime 
salvage, contingent fees and unconditional service guaran-
tees)? In the following, we will look first at maritime salvage 
and US tort contingent fee contracting in these regards. We 
then follow with a brief examination of the rise of uncondi-
tional guarantee contracting. 
 Maritime salvage and contingent fees. Despite historical 
differences as to the origins and history of no-cure-no-pay 
and no-win-no-fee principles, there is considerable evidence 
supporting our results. Critical to both contractual provisions 
is the principal's ignorance of the capabilities of various po-
tential agents, and the degree of risk in salvage as well as 
pursuit of a tort law suit. 
 As mentioned earlier, Rhodian law three thousand years 
ago specified not only no-cure-no-pay, but also the terms of 
the reward (20 percent of the salved value) and the lien. Ro-
man law also codified some of the principles of salvage con-
tracting, particularly in the Justinian Digest. Six hundred 
years later the Trani Consuls' Ordinances of the Customs of 
the Sea provided further codification. The result has been 
that these codifications and others have led to what is cur-
rently considered jus gentium, the Law of Nations [22]. For 
most of this period, it has been impossible for a ship owner 
or master to know of his potential salvors' reputation before 
concluding the contract. As the risk of salvage in the early 
days of sail was considerable (a clumsily performed towing 
job could easily dismast the salvor's vessel), the number of 
agents willing and able to provide salvage was limited much 
as in our theoretical discussion. 
 Also in American tort law, there was an early need for 
signalling capability in a frontier society where the practice 
of law alone was not necessarily a guarantee of the quality of 
the juridical assistance that one obtained. The use of a "lien'' 
on the damages recovered on successful suits had the further 
advantage of making tort law suits affordable in circum-
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stances where plaintiffs were often poor or lacked money. 
The importance of these beliefs was enhanced by the legal 
ethics of the profession which forbade lawyer advertisement. 
It was not until 1977 that the Supreme Court struck down 
this prohibition. 
 In both maritime salvage and US tort law, one could ar-
gue that lack of knowledge about agent capability has be-
come less important over time. Firstly, other reputation 
mechanisms have filled the historic void. Thus, a shipmaster 
or owner today is well acquainted with the half dozen or so 
of the most prominent salvage firms, and no-cure-no-pay 
signalling is superfluous. Similar tendencies exist within the 
US legal profession, although professional codes often in-
hibit competition in terms of the fee share of successful set-
tlements (to take US medical malpractice, for instance, an 
exhaustive study of contractual provisions [23] has discov-
ered that only one percent of contracts provided for payment 
according to an hourly fee rather than on a contingent basis. 
Of the other contracts, 80 percent were on a fixed contin-
gency basis, some 30 percent of which specified a fee of 
33.3 percent, and 46.3 percent, a fee of 40 percent). 
 Secondly, governmental regulation has done much to 
deprive ship-owner and tort plaintiff alike of contractual 
choice. Thus coastal states can insist that vessels in distress 
must sign a particular salvage contract, generally (but not 
necessarily) the Lloyds Open Form contract, and employ 
professional salvors, in particular salvage firms based in the 
coastal state concerned. Numerous statutes impose limita-
tions on contingent fees. Thus attorney's fees under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act are limited by the Judicial Code to no 
more than 25 percent after the suit is filed, and no more than 
20 percent for out of court settlements. Additionally the 
various states have their own regulations [1]. 
 The combination of professional restraints on trade and 
governmental regulation affect the assumptions of our 
model, as they together specify contractual terms of payment 
and restrict contractual choice. This means that the pure case 
for a no-cure-no-pay contract may have existed in the past, 
but it is more dubious if it does so today. 
 Unconditional service guarantees: No-satisfaction-no-
pay. The degree to which unconditional service guarantees 
are thought to be of the same contractual species as the other 
two is understandable. The institutional context in which 
unconditional guarantees are incorporated into commercial 
contracts is supportive of our model with its emphasis on the 
role of beliefs. This is particularly the case of unconditional 
guarantees as offered by professional service firms. Here the 
prices for services are high as they are in salvage and US tort 
law. Services are highly customised, and buyer resistance is 
high. There are two conditions behind the use of uncondi-
tional guarantees: 
 Firstly, brand distinction is hard to achieve. This is in 
part due to the nature of the services being provided, but also 
to professional ethical restrictions which obtain for such 
firms. 
 Secondly, recourse to unconditional guarantees is a func-
tion of a firm's desire to expand its market share, to win new 
customers from other firms [5]. An inability to establish 
brand distinction or other differentiating characteristics is 
sufficient to qualify for a variation of our hidden information 
assumption. Unlike the case of ship owner or tort plaintiff 
who in our model is confronted with a "first time in a life-
time'' situation in which principal selection of an agent is 
necessarily confined to a comparison of contracts on offer, 
principals confronting the selection of a management con-
sultant can have many alternative sources of information as 
to consultant competence, but that these sources of informa-
tion are so unreliable that the principal feels compelled to 
confine his search to the contracts offered him. 
 Does this mean that unconditional guarantees in ex ante 
contracting incentive terms are identical to no-cure-no-pay or 
no-win-no-fee provisions? Not necessarily; in fact they may 
differ in manners more subtle than those indicated by our 
model. 
 Firstly, since unconditional guarantees are often an addi-
tional agent signal to those already existing, the claim of no-
satisfaction-no-pay can have the reverse impact to that de-
sired. If a US plaintiff engages a lawyer to pursue a tort suit 
on his behalf, she now can rely on advertising information 
(since 1977). She can also utilise "word of mouth.'' That she 
will pay her lawyer on a contingent basis will not concern 
her in that she knows that this is industry practice. Contrast 
this situation with one in which firms already have well es-
tablished reputations and there is no tradition of no-
satisfaction-no-pay. In this latter situation, the addition of a 
unconditional guarantee can signal quite the opposite of what 
is intended, that potential principals (customers) may wonder 
why such a guarantee "needs stating in the first place'' [4]. 
Furthermore the guarantee may annoy customers as these 
may have assumed that they already had such an agreement 
with the agent, albeit an implicit agreement. Such considera-
tions will limit the use of unconditional guarantees and con-
fine it to service activities where the principal cannot differ-
entiate among potential agents and is forced to rely on con-
tract type to reveal agent competence. 
 Secondly, where the nature of the lien in both the salvage 
and contingency fee contracts is well-defined and the settle-
ment procedure is supported by legal institutions, the "lien'' 
and settlement procedure in unconditional guarantees are 
not. Whereas agent failure in salvage and American tort 
cases results in an unequivocal loss of agent payment, the 
situation is different in case of unconditional guarantees. 
Take, for example, corporate headhunting and recruitment 
consultancy contracts, a subject of study by Batstone and 
Clark [5] whose results are in part summarised in Table 1. 
 As can be seen in the table, guarantees are not universally 
used in this branch, possibly a sign of their separating equi-
librium properties. More important for our purposes is that in 
none of these contractual relationships is agent failure penal-
ised in the same manner as in the case of maritime salvage 
and contingent fee contracts. Losses are incurred, but are 
minimised. The guarantees tend to tie the client to the con-
sulting firm even in the case of failure. Where reimburse-
ment is considered, it is only partial reimbursement. 
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 What might be defined as a generic form of no-cure-no-
pay contracts, contracts involving not only marine salvage, 
but also US tort legal services, and a host of unconditional 
guarantee contractual forms, has been the focus of our atten-
tion in this paper. These contractual forms are not the only 
ones in which agents are not compensated in the event of 
failure, but receive payment upon success. Indeed, such con-
tracting practices are far more widespread than is generally 
thought. For example, estate agent contracts are also often 
structured on a no-sale-no-fee basis. We have not sought to 
be all-inclusive in our analysis. Rather our objective has 
been to model the general conditions under which both agent 
and principal will strictly prefer this generic form of con-
tracting to any other alternative. We have modelled these 
conditions. 
 Applying our model to marine salvage, US legal tort, and 
those professional services underwritten by unconditional 
guarantees demonstrates the difficulties of applying our 
model's use of strict preferences in two manners: Firstly, 
there are professional services in which the nature of com-
petitive signalling has changed significantly over time, but 
where contracting practices remain unaltered. Here one can 
mention the use of no-cure-no-pay in maritime salvage, and, 
perhaps, no-win-no-fee in US tort cases. Secondly, there are 
services which may not have originally used such contract 
signalling, but which are adopting it as a supplement to other 
reputation mechanisms. The increasing use of professional 
service guarantees by, for example, management consulting 
firms, is a case in point here. These variants, however, do not 
attenuate the explanatory force of our approach; rather they 
tend to indicate that the underlying variables in our model 
have led to such contracting in various industries, and that 
such contracting contains significant elements of hidden in-
formation to be disclosed in separating equilibria despite 
significantly different historical and institutional contexts. 
5. PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS 
 In this section we give formal statements of the proposi-
tions in Section 2 as well as their proofs. Using the notation 
from Section 2, we may write expected utility of the agent of 
type t as 
Ut (r,e) = V (r(b)) f (b | t,e)db ?K(e)b1
b2?  
and overall expected net payoff as 
?(r,e) = ? t
0
1? (r,e)g(t)dt = (b ? r(b)) f (b | t,e)g(t)dbdt.
b1
b2?
0
1?  
 The equilibrium conditions for the strategy pair 
(a,(rt ,et )t?[0,1]) are as follows: For the principal, 
a(rt ) =1 if and only if ? t
b1
b2? (rt ,et )g(t | rt )dt ? 0, 
where g(t | rt )  is the posterior density of types after updat-
ing by Bayes' rule; for the agent of typet, the choice of con-
tract and of effort level solves the problem 
max
(r,e )|Ut (r,e )?Ut0{ }
a(r)Ut (r,e). 
 If the agent's choice of effort given the contract r is 
unique, we may suppress it in the notation, writing 
f *(b | t)for the conditional density of b given the type t and 
the optimal level of effort connected with the equilibrium 
contract rt . 
 Proposition 1 can now be restated as follows: 
 Proposition 1. Let (a,(rt ,et )t?[0,1]) be an equilibrium, 
and assume that optimal agent effort is uniquely determined. 
Then the following hold: 
(i) for t' > t, if r ? t ? rt , then 
r ? t b1
b2? (b) f *(b | ? t )db > rtb1b2? (b) f *(b | t)db. 
(ii) if F(? | 0,e)  does not depend on e, and U ? t 0 > Ut0  for 
t' > t, then r0  is constant and there is t > 0  and 
bt > b1  such that rt (b) ? r0(b)  for b ? bt . 
Proof 
(i) We have V (rt (b)) f (b | t, ˆ e )db > V (rt (b)) f
*(b | t)db
b1
b2?
b1
b2?  by 
stochastic dominance (sinceV (rt (?))  is nondecreasing), 
where ˆ e  is such that f (b | t, ˆ e ) = f *(b | t) . Thus, there is an 
effort level ˆ e  and a contract rt  for which 
U ? t (rt , ˆ e) > rt (b) f
*(b | t)db.
b1
b2?  
 By the equilibrium property, we have that 
Table 1. Frequency of Service Guarantees in Corporate Head Hunting/Recruitment Consultancy Contracts 
 
Head Hunter Consultancy Recruitment Consultancy 
Service Guarantee (By Type) 
pct. 
Guarantee to restart process should recruit leave client during a specified period 75.1 65.8 
Partial reimbursement if recruit leaves the firm during a specified period 33.3 51.8 
Continue recruitment process if recruit/candidate rejects client's offer 89.1 ... 
Continue recruitment process if client does not recruit any of the candidates offered by 
consultancy/agent 
88.1 ... 
Source: Batstone and Clark [5]. 
Incentive Contracts The Open Economics Journal, 2008, Volume 1    53 
r ? t (b) f
*(b | ? t )db ? rt (b) f (b | ? t , ˆ e )db
b1
b2? >
b1
b2? rt (b) f *(b | t)db
b1
b2? , 
which gives the desired conclusion. 
(ii)     Since F(? | 0,e)  is independent of e, so is f (? | 0,e) , 
so f *(b | 0) = f (b | 0,0). Then r0  must be constant, 
r0(b) = ?0  for all b, since otherwise by strict concavity of 
V, U0(r,0)  could be increased with ?(r,e)  unchanged by 
replacing r0  by its expected value r0b1
b2? (b) f *(b | 0)db,  
contradicting the equilibrium properties of r. Assume that t > 
0 and that rt  is accepted by the principal. If rt (b) ? ?0  for 
all b and rt ? r0 , then 
V (rt (b)) f
*(b | 0)
b1
b2? db >V (?0),  
so that the contract violates the optimality condition defining 
an equilibrium. We conclude that rt (b) < ?0  for some 
b < bt , where bt > b1. Since the optimal contract is non-
decreasing for each t, we have that property (ii) must be sat-
isfied. 
 In the proof of Proposition 2, we need a lemma. Let 
et
*(r) = argmaxeUt (r,e)  be the optimal effort level of the 
agent of type t at the contract r. 
Lemma 1. Let (r0,r1)  be the contracts proposed by agents 
of types 0 and 1 in an equilibrium. Then 
(i) r1 maximizes U1(r,e1
*(r))  under the constraints 
U0(r,e0
*(r)) ?U0(r0,e0*(r0)) , ?1(r,e1*(r)) ? 0 , 
U1(r,e1
*(r)) ?U10,          (4) 
(ii) either r0  is accepted, and r0  maximizes U0(r,e1
*(r)) 
under the constraints 
?0(r,e0*(r)) ? 0 , U0(r0,e0*(r)) ?U00,          (5) 
or r0  is rejected, and the set of contracts r satisfying (5) is 
empty. 
 Proof: (i) If (r0,r1)  is a separating equilibrium, then in-
centive compatibility for type t = 0 gives 
U0(r1,e0
*(r1)) ?U0(r0,e0*(r0)), ?1(r,e1*(r)) ? 0  holds 
since the principal accepts r1, and finally 
U1(r1,e1
*(r)) ?U10  is the participation constraint of t = 1. 
Moreover, if there is a contract r' satisfying the constraints in 
(4) but with U1( ? r ,e1*( ? r )) > U1(r1,e1*(r1)), then r1 is not an 
optimal strategy for type 1. The condition (ii) of the proposi-
tion is a direct consequence of the definitions.  
 The formal version of Proposition 2 is as follows. 
 Proposition 2. Assume that B = b1,b2{ } , T = 0,1{ }, 
E = 0,1{ }, and that the principal uses the sceptical method 
of inference given out-of-equilibrium signals. Let r be an 
equilibrium contract, where the principal accepts at one or 
both components. Then 
(i) r = r0,r1{ }  is separating. 
 If effort has low value for the incompetent agent as given 
by (3), then 
(ii) r0(b1) = r0(b2) = ?0 , 
(iii) r1(b1) ? r0(b1) . 
Proof 
(i) We show that under the assumptions stated, there are no 
pooling equilibria. Suppose to the contrary that ˆ r , ˆ r ( )  with 
ˆ r = (ˆ r(b1), ˆ r(b2))  is a pooling equilibrium. 
 We claim first that ?0( ˆ r ,e0*(ˆ r )) ? 0 . Indeed, if 
?0( ˆ r ,e0*(ˆ r )) > 0 , then a contract r'' with ? ? r (b1) ? ˆ r(b1) > ? , ? ? r (b2) ? ˆ r(b2) > ? , for ? > 0  small 
enough would satisfy ?0( ? ? r ,e0*( ? ? r )) > 0  and 
U0( ? ? r ,e0*( ? ? r )) > U0(ˆ r ,e0*( ˆ r )) , contradicting (ii) of Lemma 
1, thus proving our claim. 
 Next, using that due to (2) we have 
?1( ˆ r ,e1*(ˆ r )) >?0(ˆ r ,e0*( ˆ r )) , we get from the participation 
constraint q?1( ˆ r ,e1*(ˆ r )) + (1? q)?0( ˆ r ,e0*(ˆ r )) ? 0  that 
?1( ˆ r ,e1*(ˆ r )) > 0 , so that there is a neighborhood U of r 
such that for separating contracts ˆ r , ? r 1( )  with ? r 1 ?U , the 
principal will accept ? r 1 as long as e*( ? r ) = e*(ˆ r ). 
 Now there are two cases to consider: (a) 
U1( ˆ r,0) > U1( ˆ r,1): Here e1
*( ˆ r ) = 0 , and e*( ? r ) = 0  for the 
contract r' with ? r (b1) = ˆ r(b1) + ?,  ? r (b2) = ˆ r(b2) , if ? > 0  is chosen small enough. We have that r' satisfies the 
constraints in (3) and that U1( ? r ,e1*( ? r )) > U1(ˆ r ,e1*( ˆ r )) . By 
Lemma 1, r' is an improvement for type 1. (b) 
U1( ˆ r,0) ?U1( ˆ r,1). Now e1*( ˆ r ) = 1 and a contract r' with ? r (b1) = ˆ r(b1), ? r (b2) = ˆ r(b2) + ?  is an improvement for 
type 1 for ? > 0  small enough. 
(ii)     Assume that r0  is constant, so that optimal effort is 
e0
*(r0) = 0 , and suppose that the contract is changed by add-
ing h > 0 in the case that outcome is b2 . If effort changes to 
1, then expected utility changes by  
?U0 = p(0,1) ? p(0,0)[ ] V (?0 + h) ?V (?0)[ ] ? K(0) ?K(1)[ ]. 
 By concavity, V (?0 + h) ?V (?0) ? ? V (?0)h , and 
since h ? b2 ? b1, we get that 
?U0 = p(0,1) ? p(0,0)[ ] ? V (?0)h ? K(0) ?K(1)[ ]  
showing that optimal effort level remains 0. Since effort 
level is always 0, overall utility of type 0 will be maximized 
using a constant contract. 
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(iii) Assume that r1(b1) > r0(b1) . If r1(b2) ? r0(b2) , 
then contract r1 is better for type 0 that r0 , contradicting 
equilibrium. Therefore r1(b2) < r0(b2) . Letting ?1 and ?2 
denote payment at outcome b1 and b2  respectively, we get 
from (1) that a change (d?1,d?2)  in the contract for type 1 
with d?2 > 0  leaves this agent indifferent if 
? d?2
d?1 ?
1? p(1,e1*(r1))
p(1,e1
*(r1))
? V (r1(b1)
? V (r1(b2))
; here the first factor on the 
right-hand side is the slope of the isoprofit curve of the prin-
cipal, and if r1(b2) < r1(b1) , then second factor is < 1 by 
strict concavity of V, so that the contract r1 could be im-
proved with the principal's acceptance. We conclude that 
r1(b2) ? r1(b1) , which in view of (ii) gives us a contradic-
tion, showing that r1(b1) < r0(b1) . 
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